政治类文章虽然考研不会考，但根据我多年的阅读和教学经验，政治类文章一般用法都非常规范，可以总结出很多地道的用法。所以各位考研的朋友平时也要适当看一下。下面这篇文章选自英语文摘今年第六期，译文可以参考杂志。欢迎同学们参与分析总结。

China's soft power
By Philip Bowring Published: April 15, 2007

HONG KONG: Of symbolism there was plenty, but whether Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's landmark visit to Japan will actually lead to closer cooperation remains to be seen. Given the recent history-obsessed relations between China and Japan it was perhaps inevitable that the past should again get more attention than the future. But broadly it looks to have been another success for Chinese diplomacy, and for Wen's projection soft power.

The visit in itself was clear enough indication of China's desire to improve relations sometimes in the face of very mixed signals from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.

While Abe's visit to Beijing last October may have set the ball rolling, some of his subsequent comments about history, and Japan's high-profile strengthening of strategic links with the United States and Australia, could have derailed the attempted rapprochement. Wen was able to use the visit to score points by raising the history issue but in the mildest, politest of ways.

Japan is also well aware that China, for domestic as well as diplomatic reasons, has cracked down on the more virulent anti-Japanese activities by mainland Web sites and patriotic groups. In return China must surely expect no more visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, events that, however justifiable to a domestic audience, have been a disaster for Japan's diplomacy.

China will also be hoping for a revival of Japanese business interest in investing in China which cooled as a result of the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment generated by the Yasukuni visits.

The prime minister went out of his way to praise Japan's contribution to China's economic growth and modernization. Beijing is aware that for all its current economic success it needs more investment in the higher-technology industries in which Japan excels. It also feels a need to cement its economic relations with Japan (and South Korea) as trade tensions with the United States increase, along with the possibility of a U.S. recession.

On specific issues, contentious or otherwise, the visit was short of progress. A promised effort to come to an accommodation over the disputed area of east China sea thought to contain oil and gas deposits was a significant step forward. Sharing of the disputed resources should be possible. But China's continued verbal challenges - mostly recently to Vietnam - to its southern neighbors over their South China sea resource rights suggests an accord will be difficult.

On broader strategic issues, there was silence. Defusing North Korea remains a topic on which the two can broadly agree, but will be less of an issue in the future should the recent nuclear deal with Pyongyang work out. China's opposition to Japan's Security Council membership remains as firm as ever - and is a major impediment to broader reform of the Council. Military build-ups on both sides seem likely to continues unabated, with Japan's worries about the China's acquisition of naval and air capability being reflected in what to Beijing appears a China-containment policy involving the United States, Australia and India. Announced exchanges of visits of senior military personnel are public relations exercises that do some good but do not change underlying realities.

The communiqué also lacked anything specific on international trade and finance issues, even though these are crucial current for both sides. There are no joint efforts to push the Doha round of WTO talks, no joint positions on the common problem of global trade surpluses and currency values. Each country continues to try to sign bilateral trade deals with its Asian neighbors, deals more likely to lead to competition for clients than to regional trade liberalization. However, there is a promise of cooperation on environmental issues that could yield results now that China acknowledges the seriousness of the problem.

The "thawing" that the visit represents must surely be welcome if only for dampening the xenophobic rhetoric of which both are guilty. But like China's recent strengthening of ties with traditional rivals Russia and India, it must be seen as part of China's two-pronged strategy, presenting a friendly face and focus on economic relations while continuing to build its power-projection ability through military, investment and diplomatic means.

Japan and China are also both just feeling their way toward a northeast Asia in which the United States will be a less dominant factor than hitherto, and in which the futures of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, both historic focuses of Sino-Japanese rivalry, remain unclear.

原文地址：http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/opinion/edbowring.php

diplomacy 僻义有：交际手段;策略;圆滑  Tom showed diplomacy in being very helpful at home the day he wanted to use the car.汤姆在想用汽车的那一天帮助家里做了不少事,显得很圆滑。

 but whether Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's landmark visit to Japan

里程碑式的访问。

老师能否有超精解？

丁sir如果可以的话以后最好把译文也给出来吧

crack down 劈啪的一声击下

no more adv.不再

Yasukuni war shrine 靖国神社

cement its economic relations 巩固它的经济关系

along with连同...一起, 随同...一

trade tensions贸易紧张

a China-containment policy 牵制中国的政策

trade surpluses 贸易盈余

bilateral trade  双边贸易

trade liberalization 贸易自动化

China's two-pronged strategy 中国的两边讨好政策

 

 

 

 

 HONG KONG: Of symbolism there was plenty, but whether Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's landmark visit to Japan will actually lead to closer cooperation remains to be seen. Given the recent history-obsessed relations between China and Japan it was perhaps inevitable that the past should again get more attention than the future. But broadly it looks to have been another success for Chinese diplomacy, and for Wen's projection soft power.
       The visit in itself was clear enough indication of China's desire to improve relations sometimes in the face of very mixed signals from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.
       While Abe's visit to Beijing last October may have
                    set the ball rolling, some of his subsequent comments about history, and Japan's high-profile strengthening of strategic links with the United States and Australia, could have derailed the attempted rapprochement. Wen was able to use the visit to score points by raising the history issue but in the mildest, politest of ways.

       Japan is also well aware that China, for domestic as well as diplomatic reasons, has cracked down on the more virulent anti-Japanese activities by mainland Web sites and patriotic groups. In return China must surely expect no more visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, events that, however justifiable to a domestic audience, have been a disaster for Japan's diplomacy.

      China will also be hoping for a revival of Japanese business interest in investing in China which cooled as a result of the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment generated by the Yasukuni visits.
  

The prime minister went out of his way to praise Japan's contribution to China's economic growth and modernization. Beijing is aware that for all its current economic success it needs more investment in the higher-technology industries in which Japan excels. It also feels a need to cement its economic relations with Japan (and South Korea) as trade tensions with the United States increase, along with the possibility of a U.S. recession.

       On specific issues, contentious or otherwise, the visit was short of progress. A promised effort to come to an accommodation over the disputed area of east China sea thought to contain oil and gas deposits was a significant step forward. Sharing of the disputed resources should be possible. But China's continued verbal challenges - mostly recently to Vietnam - to its southern neighbors over their South China sea resource rights suggests an accord will be difficult.

        On broader strategic issues, there was silence. Defusing North Korea remains a topic on which the two can broadly agree, but will be less of an issue in the future should the recent nuclear deal with Pyongyang work out. China's opposition to Japan's Security Council membership remains as firm as ever - and is a major impediment to broader reform of the Council. Military build-ups on both sides seem likely to continues unabated, with Japan's worries about the China's acquisition of naval and air capability being reflected in what to Beijing appears a China-containment policy involving the United States, Australia and India. Announced exchanges of visits of senior military personnel are public relations exercises that do some good but do not change underlying realities.

        The communique also lacked anything specific on international trade and finance issues, even though these are crucial current for both sides. There are no joint efforts to push the Doha round of WTO talks, no joint positions on the common problem of global trade surpluses and currency values. Each country continues to try to sign bilateral trade deals with its Asian neighbors, deals more likely to lead to competition for clients than to regional trade liberalization. However, there is a promise of cooperation on environmental issues that could yield results now that China acknowledges the seriousness of the problem.

        The "thawing"
                        that the visit represents must surely be welcome if only for
                    dampening the xenophobic rhetoric
                    of which both are guilty. But like China's recent strengthening of ties with traditional rivals Russia and India, it must be seen as part of China's two-pronged strategy, presenting a friendly face and focus on economic relations while continuing to build its power-projection ability through military, investment and diplomatic means.

Japan and China are also both just feeling their way toward a northeast Asia in which the United States will be a less dominant factor than hitherto, and in which the futures of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, both historic focuses of Sino-Japanese rivalry, remain unclear.

The prime minister went out of his way to praise Japan's contribution to China's economic growth and modernization. Beijing is aware that for all its current economic success it needs more investment in the higher-technology industries in which Japan excels. It also feels a need to cement its economic relations with Japan (and South Korea) as trade tensions with the United States increase, along with the possibility of a U.S. recession.

       On specific issues, contentious or otherwise, the visit was short of progress. A promised effort to come to an accommodation over the disputed area of east China sea thought to contain oil and gas deposits was a significant step forward. Sharing of the disputed resources should be possible. But China's continued verbal challenges - mostly recently to Vietnam - to its southern neighbors over their South China sea resource rights suggests an accord will be difficult.

        On broader strategic issues, there was silence. Defusing North Korea remains a topic on which the two can broadly agree, but will be less of an issue in the future should the recent nuclear deal with Pyongyang work out. China's opposition to Japan's Security Council membership remains as firm as ever - and is a major impediment to broader reform of the Council. Military build-ups on both sides seem likely to continues unabated, with Japan's worries about the China's acquisition of naval and air capability being reflected in what to Beijing appears a China-containment policy involving the United States, Australia and India. Announced exchanges of visits of senior military personnel are public relations exercises that do some good but do not change underlying realities.

        The communique also lacked anything specific on international trade and finance issues, even though these are crucial current for both sides. There are no joint efforts to push the Doha round of WTO talks, no joint positions on the common problem of global trade surpluses and currency values. Each country continues to try to sign bilateral trade deals with its Asian neighbors, deals more likely to lead to competition for clients than to regional trade liberalization. However, there is a promise of cooperation on environmental issues that could yield results now that China acknowledges the seriousness of the problem.

        The "thawing"
                that the visit represents must surely be welcome if only for
            dampening the xenophobic rhetoric
            of which both are guilty. But like China's recent strengthening of ties with traditional rivals Russia and India, it must be seen as part of China's two-pronged strategy, presenting a friendly face and focus on economic relations while continuing to build its power-projection ability through military, investment and diplomatic means.

Japan and China are also both just feeling their way toward a northeast Asia in which the United States will be a less dominant factor than hitherto, and in which the futures of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, both historic focuses of Sino-Japanese rivalry, remain unclear.

丁老师/p>[em17]

对我来说还是有点难度阿！支持丁老师

慢慢来！

确实难度不小啊！！经济术语不少呢

really useful ,but too hard for most of the learners

貌似之前看过，呵呵

I will try to translate the first page.

Please wait for my new news!

Yasukuni war shrine 靖国神社[em08]

的确发现自己懂的少的不的了，自己好渺小！！哎！！
丁老师。谢谢。呵呵~~

该用户帖子内容已被屏蔽

来学习一下!

学习啊~

对我来说也太有难度了

丁老师，您好！
最近读外刊即使单词全认识也不明白文章的意思，怎么办呀？
下面这篇文章读了三遍了越读越不知什么意思了，希望能得到您的指导，在这里不胜感激！谢谢！！！
A new trial for the head of Germany's biggest bank should unsettle investors as well as bosses
Reuters
EVERY now and again, a rumour does the rounds in Frankfurt that Deutsche Bank is planning to move its headquarters from Germany's financial capital to London or New York. Germany's biggest bank ritually restates its loyalty and the story dies down. However, such are the occasional frictions between Deutsche Bank's ways and the corporate traditions of its homeland that its bosses must sometimes be tempted to unscrew their nameplate and go. They could be forgiven for feeling that
way now, following the ruling just before Christmas by Germany's federal appeal court that the bank's chief executive, Josef Ackermann,and five other men must stand trial for a second time.
Mr Ackermann's troubles have nothing to do with his tenure at Deutsche
Bank, where he has been a successful though far from flawless leader
(see article). They stem instead from the hostile takeover in early 2000
by Britain's Vodafone of Mannesmann, a German telecommunications
company on whose supervisory board Mr Ackermann sat.Mannesmann's management resisted Vodafone's bid stoutly, extractingmuch more generous terms from the British that were worth manybillions to their shareholders. The result looked to many like a German embrace, for better or worse, of Anglo-Saxon capitalism: a successful, but fiercely fought, hostile bid, in which the views of institutional shareholders werein the end decisive. The rewards paid to Mannesmann's bosses after the dust settled (approved by Mr Ackermann
and the supervisory board), had an Anglo-Saxon ring to them too: €57m ($55m) in all—a lot of money to be sure,but a small fraction of the extra shareholders gained from Vodafone's successful higher offer.
In America or Britain, these bonuses might have raised a few eyebrows and caused a whistle or two. In Germany,said prosecutors, they were illegal: Mr Ackermann and his colleagues had no business to approve them. Thecompany was not contractually obliged to pay its executives so handsomely and, since they were leaving, the
payments could not be construed as incentives. A trial ensued. In July 2004, a court found that securities law had been breached, but not seriously enough to warrant conviction, and the men were acquitted. The prosecutors,though, appealed and have now won a fresh trial. Although the prosecutors still have to prove their guilt, the appeal court's presiding judge hardly sounded sympathetic to Mr Ackermann and the rest, calling the payments “an irresponsible waste of company money”.
Sorry, I'm out of the office
All this, of course, is unsettling for Mr Ackermann and his bank. Although he is determined to keep his job, the prospect of a time-consuming second trial is an unwelcome distraction at best. And a guilty verdict, even if it didnot mean a prison sentence, would surely make his position untenable.
However, the legal to and fro ought to be as disturbing for investors in German companies as it is for their bosses.After Vodafone bought Mannesmann, they might have assumed that the market for corporate control in Germany was starting to work much as it does in America or Britain. Now they cannot be so certain. At the very least,members of German boards would do well to be much better briefed and prepared when dealing with takeovers than Mr Ackermann and his colleagues appear to have been.
But there is a lesson for German policymakers too. At the end of this case, they should make sure that investors and managers know where they stand. If after-the-fact rewards for extracting high prices from bidders are illegal,or if clear limits on them are to be set, so be it. But this could hurt the very interests that prosecutors aresupposed to be protecting. If managers of listed companies see little gain in fighting a hostile bid, no one should besurprised if they choose a quiet life. Friendly mergers and alliances are much less bother, especially if less heed
can be paid to shareholders (including small ones).
Some German politicians may take comfort from the potential buttressing of a traditional German form ofcapitalism. Maybe they shouldn't. Corporate control, like anything that can be bought and sold, has a habit ofending up with those who value it most. If shareholders in listed companies decide that juicy takeove